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LIBERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
AIR TRANSPORTATION MARKETS: 
THE EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON 
MARKET TRENDS
Dawna L. Rhoades
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
ABSTRACT
Since the United States deregulated its airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978, the international air transport industry has been on a path toward market 
liberalization. Market changes have included entry, capacity, and pricing freedom as well as 
increased levels of foreign ownership. The recent terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 have 
the potential to alter, if not reverse this course. This paper examines the forces fueling the 
trend toward liberalization and analyzes the impact of recent events on the future prospects 
of open aviation markets.
INTRODUCTION
According to the World Investment Report 2001 
published by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, global foreign direct 
investment rose to a record US$1.3 trillion 
dollars in 2000. Contributing to this increase 
was the number of cross border mergers and 
acquisitions, which were up nearly 50 percent to 
US$1.1 trillion (UNCTAD, 2001). In addition to 
the growth in FDI, world merchandise and 
service exports have continued to post significant 
gains. World Trade Organization figures 
indicate that merchandise exports rose to 
US$5.47 trillion dollars in 1999 while service 
exports rose to US$1.35 trillion for the same 
period. Travel services accounted for $440
billion of these dollars (World Trade Organiza­
tion, 2001). The latest estimates from the 
International Air Transport Association are that 
the total economic output of the air transport 
industry is over US$1.3 trillion. In the United 
States alone, the airline industry contributed 
nearly $273 billion dollars to the total economy, 
including $109.1 billion in direct expenditures 
(salaries, purchase of equipment, etc), $109.1 
billion in indirect benefits (airports revenue, 
travel agency), and $54.6 billion in visitor 
spending and conference revenues (Air Transport 
Association, 2000).
While the international air transport industry 
has played a significant role in globalization of 
economic activity, the industry itself has
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remained firmly rooted in the domestic market. 
Governments around the world have treated 
airlines like a public utility whose service is said 
to be in the public interest. The public interest 
argument is based on three areas: national 
security and use in national defense under 
programs like the U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet 
program, postal air delivery, and contribution to 
commercial activity (Kane, 1999). International 
airlines also “carry the flag” and represent the 
national achievement and pride of their home 
country. This latter role is not to be underesti­
mated. When the bankruptcy and subsequent 
grounding of the Swissair fleet forced the Swiss 
football team to fly Aeroflot to a qualifying match 
in Moscow, one article reported this as a “further 
humiliation for the Swiss flag carrier” (Hall, 
Grant, Done, Cameron, and Dombey, 2001).
Because of the special status accorded to air 
transport, governments have always taken an 
interest in promoting and protecting their 
national carriers. Directly or indirectly govern­
ments played an important role in shaping their 
national aviation systems. A tightly regulated 
international aviation market whose basic 
precepts were laid out even before the end of 
World War II insured protecting the national 
industry and its carrier(s). In recent years that 
regulatory regime has come under increasing 
pressure to liberalize. The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 have called this trend into 
question as governments worldwide now struggle 
with issues of security. Many of these 
governments are also faced with an aviation 
system on the verge of collapse.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First, the 
regulatory development of the air transportation 
system will be reviewed, including the rationales 
for treating air transport as a special case in 
international business. Second, the forces 
leading to liberalization of this market will be 
examined. Third, the progress in air liberali­
zation will be discussed prior to the recent 
terrorist attacks. Finally, the impact of these 
attacks on the transportation industry and 
liberalization will be assessed.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
The development of a regulatory regime for the 
international air transport industry can be 
divided into four phases. Phase I witnessed the 
birth of the industry and a philosophical struggle 
between freedom and tight regulation. Phase II 
began with the reluctant acceptance of a system 
of relatively tight regulation. Phase III saw 
deregulation of the U.S. air transport industry 
and renewed efforts for a more liberal inter­
national air transport regime. Phase IV may 
mark its beginning on September 11, 2001 with 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon.
Phase I, 1910-1943
Seven years after the first heavier-than-air, 
manned flight of the Wright Brothers at Kitty 
Hawk, the first international conference on air 
navigation was convened in Paris in 1910. The 
key debate was over the rights and privileges of 
flying. One view sought to apply the “Freedom of 
the Seas” model to the entire airspace and was 
championed by the French and German 
delegations. The other view argued for the 
sovereignty of nations over the airspace above 
their terrestrial borders with rights to control 
entry and in airspace activities. The British 
were the key proponents of the national 
sovereignty faction. While the Paris Conference 
did succeed in identifying the key concepts, 
terms, and technical provisions of international 
aviation, it failed to resolve the freedom/ 
sovereignty debate. In the absence of interna­
tional agreement, the British moved to pass the 
British Aerial Navigation Act in 1911 (amended 
in 1913). This act declared British rights to its 
sovereign airspace and gave the Home Secretary 
full power to regulate the entry of foreign 
aircraft. The other European governments 
followed the British example prior to the 
beginning of World War I.
World War I clearly demonstrated the potential 
of aviation in the military arena as an offensive 
and defensive weapon. The ability of aircraft to
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support the transportation of troops and 
equipment would not be fully realized until 
World War II, but the supporting role of aviation 
was not ignored following World War I. An 
aeronautical commission formed as part of the 
Peace Conference ending World War I decided to 
prohibit the development of military aviation in 
Germany but to allow civil aviation to continue. 
The Commission also drafted the Paris 
Convention of 1919 whose first article 
proclaimed the right of each state to “complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory.” The Paris Convention would 
remain in effect until superceded by the Chicago 
Convention (Sochor, 1991).
The period between the two world wars saw two 
different models of government intervention in 
the development of the domestic air trans­
portation system. Direct intervention became 
the most frequent method of promoting domestic 
aviation. Governments either provided direct 
subsidies and/or assumed full or partial 
ownership of air transport companies. British 
Airways and Air France are two classic examples 
of this strategy. The British Overseas Airways 
Corporation (BOAC) was created in 1939 when 
two smaller British carriers were merged and 
nationalized. Air France emerged in 1933 from 
the merger and nationalization of Air Orient, Air 
Union, CIDNA and SGTA (Hengi, 2000). This 
direct intervention did not suit the philosophical 
and political tastes of U.S. lawmakers and 
officials. Indirectly, the U.S. government 
strongly influenced domestic air transportation 
through the U.S. Post Office Department that 
was authorized by the Air Mail Act of 1925, also 
called the Kelly Act, to enter into contracts with 
private persons or companies to transport mail 
by air. The Air Mail Act was amended in 1930 to 
give the postmaster the authority to consolidate 
routes in the public interest. Postmaster Walter 
F. Brown used his authority to redraw the air 
map of the U.S. and award air mail contracts to 
a small group of airlines that he considered well 
run and financially stable. In fact, Brown had 
told the carriers that the air mail routes would 
be consolidated and awards granted only to 
carriers with sufficient size to serve the route.
This “forced” major consolidation in the industry 
in an effort to obtain these very lucrative 
contracts, which could provide the stable income 
that passenger service did not offer.
Many routes started offering passenger service 
to provide “additional income” to their air mail 
business (Davies, 1984). A scandal fueled by 
smaller carriers who were excluded from these 
contracts temporarily halted all airmail awards. 
The Air Mail Act of 1934 changed the system of 
awarding contract and barred all prior contract 
holders from bidding on new awards. However, 
the new post-master general, Farley, privately 
advised these airlines to reorganize and reapply. 
Thus, the airlines known as American Airlines, 
Eastern Airlines, and United Airlines were 
formed. In fact, almost all of the major U.S. 
carriers except Southwest, America West, and 
Alaska Airlines can trace their origin to early air 
mail carriers. The increasing importance of air 
mail added a further argument to the “public 
interest” status of air transportation (Wells, 
1994). By 1998, the ten major U.S. airlines were 
responsible for carrying over 251,279 tons of mail 
(Aviation Week, 2000).
Phase II, 1944-1978
While World War I hinted at the importance of 
air transportation to the security of nations, 
World War II with the Battle of Britain and mas­
sive bombing campaigns clearly demonstrated 
it’s potential. The technological advances made 
during and just prior to the war also showed that 
the industry could contribute economically as an 
engine for innovation. Even as U.S. President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill were meeting in 
Quebec to plan the cross-channel invasion, the 
topic of a general meeting to discuss the future of 
air transportation came up as an issue. The 
conference was convened in Chicago on 
November 1, 1944. Representatives of all but 
one of the allied World War II nations attended 
it. The delegates were presented with four 
proposals for an international aviation system. 
The joint proposal of Australia and New Zealand 
called for international ownership and manage­
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ment of all international air service. The United 
States proposal sought a system with 
unrestricted air service rights and market-based 
control of frequency and fare issues. The British 
wanted an international regulatory body to 
distribute air routes and determine frequency 
and fares. The Canadians offered a compromise 
proposal that would have allowed limited 
competition in a system controlled by a 
multilateral oversight body. No agreement could 
be reached on the main issues. Neither the U.S. 
nor Great Britain was willing to compromise 
their positions or jeopardize efforts to conclude 
the war. Great Britain also had one final card to 
play—landing rights. They suggested the 
possibility of developing an all-Commonwealth 
airline with exclusive landing rights in 
Commonwealth and British territories. Since 
the parties had no reason to assume that the 
British Empire would change following the war, 
this appeared to be a credible threat (Sochor, 
1991).
Without agreement on anything but the basic 
freedoms at the conclusion of the Chicago 
Convention, national governments were forced to 
fall back on the traditional means of resolving 
territorial disputes—treaty. In 1946, two key 
wartime allies and aviation leaders, the United 
States and the United Kingdom, met to negotiate 
and sign the first bilateral air service agreement. 
The Bermuda Agreement as it is now known 
became the model for all future bilateral air 
service agreements. The Agreement granted 
each party the five freedoms of the air (Table 1 
lists these five and the four additional freedoms 
added later.) on named routes for multiple 
carriers without specifying capacity or frequency 
limitations. The U.S. also agreed in principle to 
the establishment of an international body, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
to set fares. Subsequent bilaterals not including 
the U.S. also included frequency and capacity 
limitations that attempted to split air traffic 
between designated carriers of the two countries
TABLE 1
THE FREEDOMS OF THE AIR
Freedom Description
First The right to fly over the territory of a contracting state without landing
Second The right to land on the territory of the contracting state for non-commercial purposes
Third The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail for the state of registration to the aircraft to another state
and set them down there
Fourth The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states in another contracting state 
and to transport them to the state of registration of the aircraft
Fifth The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states as a continuation of, or as a
preliminary to, the operation of the third or fourth freedoms
Sixth The right to take on board passengers, cargo, and mail in one state and to transport them to a third state
after a stopover in the aircraft’s state of registration and vice versa
Seventh The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail between two other states on a service that does not touch 
the aircraft’s country of registration
Eighth The right to transport passengers, cargo, and mail within the territory of a state that is not the aircraft’s 
country of registration (full cabotage)
Ninth The right to interrupt a service
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involved. A pooling agreement was often 
included to insure that revenue was evenly 
divided between country carriers (Toh, 1998).
Bermuda I was a compromise that clearly 
favored the U.S., as did most of the other 
agreements signed shortly after the war. Unlike 
the nations of Europe, the U.S. had both a 
number of air carriers and an intact aviation 
system. It also had money that many countries 
sought to help them rebuild following the war. 
As a result, the U.S. carriers were granted 
greater capacity and frequency freedom as well 
as more extensive beyond or fifth freedom rights. 
By 1976, the British felt confident enough to give 
notice of their decision to terminate Bermuda I. 
The Bermuda II agreement, signed in 1977 
eliminated multiple carrier designations, limited 
capacity, and restricted American fifth freedom 
rights. The U.S. viewed this as a major setback 
in the liberalization of international air 
transport (Toh, 1998).
Phase III, 1979-2000
To demonstrate it’s commitment to air transport 
liberalization, the United States initiated three 
actions in 1978. In early 1978, the U.S. issued a 
statement entitled “Policy for the Conduct of 
International Air Transportation.” This state­
ment reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
liberalization. Shortly afterwards, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued an order to 
IATA to “show cause” why they should not be 
considered an illegal cartel as prohibited by U.S. 
anti-trust law. Since LATA membership was 
restricted to international airlines whose major 
tasks included setting fares and capacity, there 
was little argument of violation. Finally, in late 
1978, the United States became the first 
government in the world to deregulate its air 
transport industry with the passage of the 
Airline Deregulation Act. This Act would phase 
out the CAB with it’s market control over 
entry/exit, pricing, and service levels and house 
the remaining safety functions of the federal 
government with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).
The International Air Transportation Competi­
tion Act (IATCA) of 1979 laid out the competitive 
goals of future U.S. policy as encouraging 1) 
multiple carrier designation without operational 
restrictions, 2) market-based determination of 
air fares, and 3) elimination of unfair and 
discriminatory competitive practices such as 
excessive user fees, exclusive airport services, 
and limited access to facilities. These features 
are incorporated in the U.S. policy of open skies 
(see Toh, 1998 for further discussion). The U.S. 
pursued two paths toward fostering open skies. 
The Director of the Bureau of Pricing and 
Domestic Aviation at the CAB laid out the first 
path. The so-called Encirclement Strategy called 
for the U.S. to bring pressure on smaller market 
countries to sign open skies agreement as a 
means of diverting traffic from larger aviation 
markets. This strategy was based on the 
assumption that open skies would lower fares 
between those countries involved and cause 
passengers to change their traveling patterns in 
pursuit of lower fares. The pressure of falling 
traffic would then encourage larger market 
countries such as the United Kingdom and 
Japan to accept the more liberalized open skies 
agreement (Levine, 1979). The U.S. first sought 
open skies with smaller market countries. These 
countries generated very little third and fourth 
freedom traffic (to and from the U.S.), but stood 
to gain by getting greater access to U.S. 
destinations. There could also be no question of 
exchanging domestic opportunities since these 
small nations had little domestic traffic to 
exchange (Antoniou, 2001). There is evidence to 
support the economic benefits of open skies. In 
the case of the U.S.-Canadian agreement, results 
in the year immediately following the 
implementation of the agreement saw an 
increase in traffic of over one million passengers 
as well as growth in the number of cities served 
(Office of International Aviation, 1996; Pustay, 
1997).
The second path to open skies came through the 
application of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s (DOT) policy on approving 
airlines alliances. This policy based approval on
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either the coverage of the rights under existing 
bilateral or proven benefits to the U.S. (Gellman 
Research Associates, 1994). In addition, the U.S. 
DOT has granted immunity from antitrust to 
alliances between carriers from open skies 
countries. Antitrust immunity allows competi­
tors to coordinate on issues of pricing, capacity, 
and scheduling. This has allowed those alliances 
with immunity to achieve greater levels of 
operational integration, thus cutting costs and 
improving quality through coordination (Oum 
and Park, 1997). The “carrot and stick” 
approach toward achieving open skies has 
results in some 50 open skies agreements (Table 
2).
Other countries were also pursuing a more 
liberal approach to aviation. Unlike the U.S. 
domestic deregulation, the Europeans opted for 
a more gradual approach to aviation 
deregulation. The first and second packages 
(1987 and 1990 respectively) liberalized air 
transport among members of the European 
Community by creating additional route and 
carriers designation as well as lifting capacity 
limitations. The third package, which became 
effective in 1993, phased in further liberalization 
ending in April 1997 with the creation of a single 
aviation market in the European Union (Morrell, 
1998). Under this single market, carriers 
established in any of the EU countries are 
granted all of the so-called freedoms of the air. 
With this step, the Europeans have taken the 
lead in air transport liberalization. In fact, the 
position of the European Commission, 
Directorate General for Transport on open skies 
is that “[o]pen skies is an American term which, 
as we see it, is synonymous with a free for all 
system depending on the good behavior of air 
carriers and only a partial opening of the 
market” (Sorenson, 1998, p. 125). The current 
European view is that ownership and domestic 
markets should be opened. These concepts are 
embodied in a proposal put forth by the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) called 
the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area 
(TCAA). While the AEA suggests that TCAA 
should include liberalization of airline ownership 
and right of establishment as well as harmoni­
zation of competition and leasing policies, the 
basic objective “must be to ensure that all 
airlines of the parties to the TCAA will have 
unrestricted commercial opportunities to conduct 
the business of air transport anywhere within 
the TCAA.” (Association of European Airlines, 
2001). Acceptance of this agreement would 
essentially create a single aviation market across 
the North Atlantic.
Other areas associated with air transport have 
also been undergoing liberalization including the 
privatization of airports, air traffic control 
systems, and airport related services such as 
security and the removal of restrictive policies 
that favored domestic over foreign carriers. The 
privatization of airports began in 1987 when 
Great Britain sold seven of its airports to the 
British Airport Authority (BAA). Since this 
time, airports in Australia, Germany, Italy, 
Argentina and a dozen other countries have 
shifted from public to private hands (Pope, 1996; 
Utt, 1999). Air traffic control systems have been 
or are being privatized in such countries as 
Canada, Switzerland, South Africa, and 
Germany in the belief that private firms would 
not only be able to raise capital more quickly but 
would have a greater incentive to modernize 
ATC systems, decreasing delays and improving 
safety (McCartney, 2001).
In short, the aviation industry in general 
underwent a major reorientation during the 
third phase of its existence. Liberalization 
increasingly won out over efforts to maintain the 
tightly restricted markets of the past. These 
efforts have made air travel more affordable for 
passengers and airfreight more viable for 
international shippers. Liberalization has placed 
a burden on those few remaining government- 
owned and run international airlines. It has also 
threatened the small, nation market airlines 
such as the Belgian airline Sabena. In fact, 
liberalization has been a particular burden on 
small, developing nations that have neither the 
resources to compete effectively with the larger 
international carriers nor the markets to attract 
foreign interest and investment (Abeyratne, 
1998). Nevertheless, as economies grew the level
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TABLE 2
OPEN SKIES AGREEMENTS
Year Date Country Year Date Country
2000 11/28 Benin 1995 6/14 Austria
7/27 Burkino Faso 9/5 Belgium
5/2 Gambia 6/16 Denmark
3/16 Ghana 6/9 Finland
10/12 Malta 6/14 Iceland
10/11 Morocco 6/6 Luxembourg
3/16 Namibia 6/16 Norway
8/26 Nigeria 6/16 Sweden
6/30 Portugal 6/15 Switzerland
10/11 Rwanda
12/15 Senegal
1/8 Slovak Rep.
8/28 Tanzania
5/2 Turkey
1999 12/6 Argentina 1992 10/14 The Netherlands
5/24 Bahrain
10/21 Chile
12/16 Dominican Republic
12/6 Italy
11/10 Jordan
4/12-29 Pakistan
10/21 Qatar
4/13 Umted Arab Emirates
1998 6/9 Korea
7/14 Antilles (Netherlands)
6/10 Peru
7/15 Romania
6/9 South Korea
3/18 Taiwan
2/27 Uzbekistan
1997 9/18 Aruba
6/20 Brunei
5/8 Costa Rica
5/8 El Salvador
5/8 Guatemala
5/8 Honduras
6/21 Malaysia
6/18 New Zealand
5/8 Nicaragua
5/8 Panama
4/8 Singapore
1996 9/10 Czech Republic
5/42 Germany
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of air travel increased. Faster growing regions 
such as Asia saw double-digit growth rates 
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Phase IV: 2001 and Beyond
Even before September 11th, the U.S. airline 
industry was on a path to lose US $2 billion 
(Arndt, Byrnes, and Woellert, 2001). Part of the 
blame can be attributed to the same two 
historical forces that have plagued the industry 
for decades, a softening economy and over­
capacity. As one famous disgruntled investor, 
Warren Buffet, has noted,
The airline business, from the time of 
Wilber and Orville Wright through 1991, 
made zero money net (Miller and 
Barnhart, 2001).
In fact, the industry suffered its worst previous 
loss between 1990-1993 when it posted losses in 
excess of US$10 billion (Rosen, 1995). The 
airline industry is an old-line, cyclical industry 
with high fixed costs and a very unionized, 
powerful labor force. The industry that 
witnessed significant consolidation following de­
regulation has become increasingly concentrated 
with the top ten major carriers responsible for 
the carriage of the bulk of U.S. scheduled traffic.
While the remainder of the 1990s saw improved 
profitability, there were a number of troubling 
trends including sharp declines in overall service 
quality (rising customer complaints, delays), 
disgruntled high yield business passengers, and 
labor unrest at such airlines as United, 
American, and Comair (Rhoades and 
Waguespack, 2001). Even the US$15 billion 
bailout of the Air Transportation Stabilization 
Act is not likely to prevent a number of U.S. 
carriers from filing for bankruptcy (Arndt et al, 
2001). Meanwhile European carriers are already 
protesting this government aid and requesting 
assistance from their own governments (Flottau, 
2001). Some of the hardest hit EU airlines are 
already requesting assistance (Sparaco and Wall, 
2001).
If there were ever any questions of the economic 
importance of the air transport industry before, 
there are few who doubt it now. U.S. airlines 
have already announced layoffs of approximately 
100,000 employees and some estimates claim 
that there will be an additional six jobs lost in 
the U.S. economy for each airline loss. The 
airline industry appears unlikely to turn a profit 
until at least 2003. Initially, the hardest hit 
area will be the travel and tourism industry, 
which generates over US$578.8 billion a year 
and supports one out of every 17 jobs. Aircraft 
manufacturers such as Boeing will also be hard 
hit and are preparing for layoffs. Other aviation 
system manufacturers such as Rockwell Collins, 
Textron, Honeywell, and Goodrich are likely to 
follow suit raising manufacturing layoffs up to 
100,000 (Arndt and Woellert, 2001; Isidore, 2001; 
Mecham, 2001).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Given the impact of recent events, the trend 
toward further liberalization in international 
transport is likely to stall and may well reverse 
itself as nations struggle to stabilize their 
aviation industries. The U.S. bailout smacks of 
the kind of government subsidy that the U.S. has 
historically derided other governments for 
providing and includes provisions that would see 
the U.S. government taking a non-voting stake 
in airline ownership through either stock 
options, warrants or other equity devices (Bond, 
2001; Toh, 1998). Government authorities, 
particularly in the U.S., may well rethink their 
position on industry consolidation in the face of 
widespread industry bankruptcy. If the 
bankrupt carriers are allowed to continue 
operation as Continental and America West did 
during previous bankruptcies, the industry 
would likely face the same devastating price 
wars that have plagued it in the past as cash- 
strapped carriers drive prices down and keep 
capacity up (Wolf, 1995). The inability of air 
transportation to generate long-term profitability 
has driven stock prices down over 41 percent and 
downgraded some carrier’s credit rating to junk 
bond status (Isidore, 2001). Insurance premiums
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have risen by a factor of 15 for war risk and 
eight-fold for passenger liability (Sparaco, 2001). 
Increased security costs will either be passed 
onto consumers or borne by the U.S. government 
if security is federalized (Arndt and Woellert, 
2001; Ott, 2001).
It is clear that liberalization will be at least 
temporarily stalled as governments struggle 
with the immediate security and economic issues 
raised by the terrorist attacks. The length of 
the stall is partly contingent on the global efforts 
to “root out terrorism.” The long-term fate of 
international aviation is a matter of conjecture, 
but the following three scenarios seem most 
likely.
Scenario One
The trend toward liberalization reverses itself as 
nations revert to a very protectionist approach to 
aviation. The longer the war on terror, the more 
likely international aviation is to slip back into 
the old protectionist pattern. If the events of 
September 11th threaten to devastate national 
airlines and economies, governments are even 
more likely to take actions to protect jobs and 
markets. Even before 9/11, there were forces at 
work that sought to pull back from liberalization. 
Examples of this trend include the European 
debate over the fate of Sabena and Swissair. 
The Belgian and Swiss governments are intent 
on “saving” their national airlines for reasons 
that opponents believe violate the concepts of 
free, open markets. The Canadian decision to 
allow Air Canada to merge with Canadian 
Airlines was also seen as a resurgence of 
aviation nationalism. Most recently, Europeans 
have complained that the U.S. package of loan 
guarantees to post-9/11 carriers exceeded the 
level warranted by shutdown losses and should 
constitute illegal subsidies.
Scenario Two
Consolidation accelerates to the point that 
national governments feel forced to consider 
allowing at least limited foreign involvement in 
domestic markets as a means of generating
competition. This has already occurred in 
Canada where government officials have not only 
indicated that they might consider allowing 
foreign carriers into the domestic market but 
have floated a proposal for a North American 
single aviation area. Under this scenario, a 
TCAA might also come about for several reasons. 
First, the security levels of most EU carriers are 
at least equal if not higher than current U.S. 
levels. Secondly, allowing EU allies in the war 
on terror into the U.S. market would be more 
palatable than throwing the market open to all 
foreign nationals. Finally, it might be seen as a 
reasonable concession to allies who have pushed 
for such an opening. In an effort to aid their 
airlines, the EU members might push even 
harder. They could be aided in their efforts by a 
decision due out in early 2002 from the European 
Court of Justice on whether the EC has the right 
to negotiate aviation agreements with countries 
outside the EU. If the EC were to declare the 
EU a single aviation unit, then the extensive 
“beyond rights” of US carriers would be 
considered cabotage and voided (Bond, 2001).
A number of issues would have to be resolved 
before this scenario could come about including 
changes in ownership rules, right of establish­
ment, and harmonization of a number of the 
laws and policies affecting aviation including 
anti-trust policies, operation of aircraft, leasing, 
etc (European Cockpit Association, 2000). There 
could be a disconnect between the domestic and 
international markets. In an effort to reduce 
costs, many major carriers have announced plans 
to withdraw from less profitable domestic routes, 
many of whom will see regional carrier entry 
(Ott, 2001). In addition, the growth of general 
and business aviation could continue as aviation 
fears, disgruntled business passengers, and 
flexjet leasing programs make it an attractive 
option to commercial travel. Major carriers 
would then focus more on international aviation. 
In effect, there would be a system of smaller, 
regional carriers linking to major, international 
hubs. With a further relaxation of ownership 
rules, it is possible that the Australian/New 
Zealand proposal at the Chicago Convention for 
internationally owned and managed carriers
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would finally become a reality. The current 
mega-alliance (Star, Oneworld, SkyTeam) 
structure might form the nucleus of such 
carriers.
Scenario Three
In a further twist, it is possible that the industry 
would decouple even further into distinct 
businesses such as fleet management, 
transportation, and marketing (Sparaco, 2001). 
This decoupling might allow the industry to get 
around some of the ownership restrictions that 
currently prevent international consolidation. 
Arguments for this type of decoupling draw their 
rationale from two distinct but related fields of 
strategic thinking. The first area is concerned 
with defining a firm’s core or distinctive 
competency. This resource-based view of the 
firm suggests that firms are collections of 
tangible and intangible assets that when 
combined develop competency in certain areas. 
This competency is defined as a skill, knowledge 
or ability that a firm possesses that allows it to 
achieve a competitive advantage over its rivals 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Under this theory, airlines would determine 
what activity they could perform better than 
rivals, then focus on this activity and outsource 
other activities to firms that have an advantage 
in that area.
The second, related area concerns the value 
chain. In essence, a firm is a collection of linked 
activities that may produce value for customers 
(Porter, 1985). In a decoupled system, higher 
profits would accrue to firms performing higher 
value-added activities. Industries can be said to 
have value chains, sequences of activities that 
lead to a final product or service. In 
manufacturing settings such as automobiles, 
aircraft, etc., it appears that the integrator (firm 
responsible for some parts manufacturing, 
supply network management, and final product 
assembly) earns the superior industry returns 
(Galbraith, 1995). For the airline industry or 
more broadly speaking the travel industry, the 
question becomes who in the value chain is best 
able to assume this role. To a limited extent, the
travel agent once performed the role of 
integrator, but this role has been undermined by 
cuts in commission fees, internet access, and 
other direct marketing efforts. Conceivably, a 
firm or group of firms could assume this role, 
adding value to customers by packaging multi­
modal transportation with accommodations, 
vacation packages, etc.
Theoretically, the idea of a “virtual airline” that 
outsources aircraft, cockpit/cabin crew, 
engineering and maintenance, ground handling, 
accounting, and reservations is appealing 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 
1997). This would allow the virtual airline to 
escape two factors that tend to plague the 
industry during economic downturns—over­
capacity and high labor costs. The virtual airline 
would possess the flexibility to reduce both labor 
and fleet quickly. The practical details of the 
virtual airline are more perplexing. On a small 
scale, the concept appears workable, but 
envisioning a virtual airline the size of American 
Airlines is difficult. It is also difficult to envision 
how a traditional airline like American could 
make the shift to virtual. For example, a shift to 
outsourced fleet and crew would likely have to be 
gradual and would incur the opposition of 
existing labor unions who might well be 
prepared to take labor action to prevent the 
shift.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
The international aviation industry is clearly at 
a crossroads. While the industry and the govern­
ments who regulate it might be tempted to fall 
back into the familiar highly regulated days of 
the past, it is doubtful that we will see a 
complete reversal if for no other reason than 
customer dissatisfaction. Airline managers, 
government officials, and the industries that 
support aviation need to begin planning for this 
“brave new world.” The key unknown in these 
calculations is the timeframe. Change is not 
something that individuals or firms tend to 
embrace gladly, so it is likely that the industry 
will seek to draw out the transition to something 
like a TCAA on the argument that firms need
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time to make the structural adjustments 
necessary. A similar argument was made for 
NAFTA phase-in. For the near term, scenario 
two seems most likely to succeed in some form. 
The rationale again stems from the fact that this 
change is more of an extension of what went 
before than the decoupling of the industry that 
would represent a dramatic shift in mindset, 
core competency, and basic industry givens.
A number of questions remain unresolved in the 
decoupled scenario that makes it difficult to 
determine its viability or establish any time- 
frame for implementation. First, it is unclear 
how and/or why firms might choose a given 
decoupled segment from a value and profitability 
perspective. As stated earlier, the two areas that 
have generally been cited as preventing the 
industry from achieving long-term profitability 
are overcapacity and labor problems. Individual 
airlines in good times tend to add aircraft to 
their fleet. Then, the inevitable bad times occur 
and the overall industry is faced with 
overcapacity. Individual carriers with new, 
expensive fleets tend to attempt to lower prices 
to fill seats cutting into margins and triggering 
price wars. It is unclear how a decoupled fleet 
management firm would derive long-term 
profits. There are likely to be some “economies” 
to exploit and it is possible to compensate for 
regional downturns by shifting fleets, but a 
global downturn like the post-9/11 environment 
would seem to put such firms at high risk. The 
issue becomes—What type of firm would seek to 
fill this decoupled niche? Some firm must do so 
to make the overall system work. In regard to 
the second factor affecting long-term 
profitability, there are examples of firms 
outsourcing maintenance. There are clearly 
“economies” to be gained by consolidating 
maintenance. It also would be possible to 
outsource flight attendants. However, the key 
labor group has always been pilots. In bad 
times, they have given up wage/working 
conditions to aid firms, but these concessions 
have been the target of immediate concern when 
profits return. Any scenario that threatens this 
group is a likely to stir rapid reaction. When the 
idea of using flight crews from lower wage
alliance partners was floated, unions were quick 
to form inter-alliance union groups to block these 
efforts (Gill, 1998). Even the reservation/yield 
management systems a la Sabre that have often 
been viewed as a key source of advantage in the 
industry have come under criticism for creating 
complex pricing schemes that drive away 
customers, particularly the high margin business 
travelers that support the much larger low fare 
passengers. This is not to say that it is not 
possible to develop a business model for 
decoupled segments that would be capable of 
attracting investment, but it is an elusive 
possibility.
Under Scenario Two, the international carriers 
would restructure their routes and fleets toward 
the international long haul market leaving the 
domestic markets to short-haul, lower cost 
carriers that would feed international hubs 
either because of market forces or marketing 
agreements with the international carriers. This 
would be more of an adjustment of U.S. carriers 
than those in Europe where the flag carriers 
have primarily focused on international routes. 
Competition between individual carriers in a 
TCAA would focus on several key areas: cost and 
fare structure, service quality, and route 
structure/access. In a study of cost competitive­
ness among international carriers, Oum and Yu 
(1997) found that U.S. carriers are more cost 
competitive than all but a small number of Asian 
carriers that benefit from lower labor costs. This 
allows U.S. carriers to offer lower fares and still 
make a profit. On the other hand, U.S. carriers 
are rarely rated highly in surveys of 
international service quality (Zagat, 1992). It is 
less clear how consumers in an open aviation 
market would make the tradeoff between price 
and service quality.
CONCLUSION
Air transportation is a critical link in the global 
system. It has been an enabling factor in a 
process of globalization that has witnessed the 
fall of most tariff barriers, the establishment of 
the World Trade Organization, and the 
integration of many national economies into
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broader trading associations. Yet, air 
transportation itself has only reluctantly been 
dragged along the path to liberalization. The 
events of September 11th can either jumpstart a 
new era of liberal air transportation or stall
recent efforts to achieve liberalization. The 
United States can lead air transport liberaliza­
tion as it has led other efforts to open markets 
and economies but only by taking certain risks 
with its own air transportation system.
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